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‘‘What causes war?’’ is an impossibly seductive question to which there is no defi-
nitive answer. The proof: no one yet has come up with a universally acceptable
explanation for this ‘‘activity’’ that has been with us since we either crawled down
from the trees or planted our first crops, depending on whose version of prehistory
you prefer. Small wonder, then, that publishers continue to show an interest in the
subject—as if, finally, suddenly, someone will have discovered something novel
and insightful to say about the nature of nature or the nature of nurture as raisons
d’eˆtre for war. Meanwhile, the sheer number of volumes devoted to the topic helps
underscore one of Martin Van Creveld’s central points in his new book, The Culture
of War: war fascinates.
Mercifully, Van Creveld does not take us all the way back to our chimpanzee past
to connect the dots between demonic males and war. Nor does he pay much attention
to evolutionary psychology or to inclusive fitness arguments as the source material for
war’s origins. Instead, he makes use of military history and finds plenty of examples
from the Old Testament through 9/11 to illustrate how tantalized we are by war’s trap-
pings. In fact, his first chapter begins with a discussion about uniforms and sets up the
gist of his broader argument: ‘‘At all times and places, the fact that those who put them
on were preparing to look death in the face tended to make uniforms, armor, and war
paint more gaudy and elaborate than anything people wore while going about their
‘ordinary’ occupations’’ (p. 26).
There are echoes of Freud in this, and Van Creveld does at least cite him on occa-
sion, but even stronger reminders of Arnold Van Gennep (Rites of Passage), whom
Van Creveld never mentions.1 This is unfortunate since Van Creveld’s descriptions
of war have liminality and communitas written all over them. One reason war is so
alluring, in Van Creveld’s view, is that normalcy is suspended. Not only does war rep-
resent the ultimate contest in which few of the usual rules apply, but everything gets
heightened. All man’s ‘‘qualities’’ are mobilized. He means this not only in terms of
‘‘all the participants’ intellectual, moral, and physical qualities’’ but also in terms of
all men—or at least all males who deserve to be called ‘‘men.’’ According to Van Cre-
veld, nothing else offers men the same ‘‘combination of concentration with lightheart-
edness and freedom,’’ a kind of freedom he repeatedly reminds us ‘‘perhaps not found
anywhere else’’ (p. 110).
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From Van Creveld’s perspective, war affords men the joy of living in the ‘‘now’’
and ‘‘pits us against the most powerful, most intelligent, and most fearsome oppo-
nent of all, another man’’ (p. 109). Dopamine and adrenaline are contributing fac-
tors; why, just reading about war gets biochemical juices flowing. Yet if biology
matters, so do group-induced sentiments. It is hard to read The Culture of War with-
out scribbling ‘‘Durkheim!’’ in the margins or wondering why Van Creveld fails to
reference Lionel Tiger’s seminal work on men in groups and the ineffable appeal of
‘‘belonging.’’2 It is perhaps forgivable, given the breadth of this topic, that Van Cre-
veld does not do sufficient justice to others’ scholarship. After all, there are entire
literatures devoted to each of his topics: weaponry, writing, art, film, monuments,
and so on, though he exhibits some curious lapses. Van Creveld ignores the role and
impact of television, for instance, and barely touches on video games. He not only
gets various culture-related facts about tribal societies, age grades, and counting
coup wrong (this seems to be a perennial hazard whenever military historians rifle
through just a handful of ethnographies), but he also misses important work that
could help him make his points more effectively. For instance, Jonathan Shay
(Achilles in Vietnam) is far more sophisticated than he is about the ‘‘beserker’’
state.3 Yet maybe some of these lapses are intentional. For example, Van Creveld
pays no attention to those ‘‘other’’ sentiments associated with war, such as terror and
fear, or the extent to which the intensity of an experience he keeps describing as
enjoyable can also drive men mad.
To be fair to Van Creveld, this book is about war’s allure, not its costs: what men
find so attractive in and about war and what makes warriors so attractive to women
and to each other. Van Creveld’s catch theme is that war ‘‘has as much or more to
do with the heart and the hormones than with the brain and its reasoning’’ (p. 187).
In asserting this he means to prove realists wrong—war is never just about politics.
And he intentionally tweaks his readership: ‘‘It is useless to pretend that most people
do not, or at any rate cannot, delight in destruction independently of any practical ben-
efits that it may bring’’ (p. 112).
In Sex and War: How Biology Explains Warfare and Terrorism and Offers a Path
to a Safer World, Malcolm Potts and Thomas Hayden echo many of Van Creveld’s
assessments of man. However, unlike him, they look to chimpanzees as our analogs
and, by making an inclusive fitness ‘‘it’s-all-about-our-genes’’ argument for male
aggression, get caught in too many familiar logic traps. Sometimes they treat genes
as the unit of account. Yet they also invoke ‘‘our very survival as a species’’ (empha-
sis added). In addition to plying readers with the same old overused examples (e.g.,
the Yanomamo), they indulge in a stunning number of sweeping generalizations. For
instance, take the generalization at the heart of their argument:Men are evolved to be
territorial and competitive, and to engage in team aggression. Women usually lived in
territories men carved out, and benefited more through ingroup [sic] cooperation and
social stability than through out-group hostility and aggression (p. 370). Even if we
accept their sociobiological premises, Potts and Hayden neglect the ways in which
women might compete on behalf of their genes or what the implications might be
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if competition itself is ‘‘hardwired.’’ This is unfortunate because there are hints of a
potentially provocative argument in this book.
Potts, who is a professor of population and family planning at Berkeley (and is a
trained obstetrician) served as the first medical director of the International Planned
Parenthood Foundation. He and Hayden (a journalist) single out Margaret Sanger for
linking family planning and peace. Of course, Malthus might also concur with them
that ‘‘there are good reasons to believe that the competition for scarce resources is at
the heart of a great many wars . . . and the larger our population, the more intense
the resource competition will be’’ (p. 143). The solution? Potts and Hayden take cur-
rent conventional wisdom—that greater economic development will lead families to
have fewer children—and flip this on its head, contending that if women were granted
access to better family planning now, smaller families would lead to greater economic
development sooner.
One problem with unfolding this family planning argument so late in the book
(in the thirteenth of fifteen chapters) is that Potts and Hayden do not then have
time to fully flesh it out. As they make clear, the rate of population growth is a
variable open to change. But if that is so, then surely something might be done
about the sex ratio, too. After all, their own arguments about team aggression and
resource scarcity suggest that this may be where the real shift needs to occur since
with fewer males to begin with, more males could become responsible and produc-
tive heads of household sooner, team aggression would become a much less attrac-
tive prospect, and older men would have a much harder time manipulating younger
men to go to war.
Maybe. But there is another dimension to male competition worth considering
beyond sheer numbers. Or to borrow one of their examples (Genghis Khan), if all
males, most males, or even some males strive to father as many children as Genghis
Khan did, then (re)aligning population growth to match resources at the macro level
still leaves us with ‘‘spoilers"—especially when ambitious individuals (e.g., Genghis
Khan) discover that creating rather than correcting imbalances holds incomparable
reward.
In The Culture of War, Van Creveld is never quite so reductive as to make this
point. But his thesis certainly implies that males who excel at war favor war and
war favors them, while one of his aims is clearly to convince us that all societies
need some such men if they do not want to be dominated by those with more (or
better) such men. In fact, while Van Creveld claims in the book’s final sentences
that he will have achieved his goal if readers agree with him that the culture of
war is as ‘‘worthy of being studied as any other subject,’’ this is actually fatuous.
What he really wants is that we (in the West) recognize that we had better retain
the culture of war, or else—or else we will be defeated by those who do find joy
in war.
Van Creveld specifically identifies four threats that can cause the culture (read:
joy) of war to be taken too far or to become atrophied. First, no discipline and no cohe-
sion yield out-of-control wild hordes. Second, militaries can lose heart, in which case
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men will perform like soulless robots rather than men (his example—the modern Bun-
deswehr). Next come men who can not or will not defend themselves when the need
arises; these are ‘‘men without chests’’ (his example—pre-Zionist Jews). The fourth
threat and the one he seems to deem most pressing is feminism.
However, if feminism is an Achilles’ heel for Western militaries, it is also Van Cre-
veld’s. This is because in trying to prove how much weaker women are than men, he
makes too many bizarre assertions. For instance, he claims ‘‘women’s weaker anat-
omy means they are less resistant to infection, hence dirt and life in the field, than men
are’’ (p. 401), as if women in villages the world over do not work in the fields. Or,
there are women’s ‘‘sensitive breasts’’ to consider, as if men’s genitalia are made
of cast iron! Then comes the claim that ‘‘uneasy about being regarded as women, men
are compelled to spend a considerable part of their energies making sure women do
not outclass them’’ (p. 404). But why—one can not help but wonder—would men
worry that women might outclass them if women are so obviously weak and so clearly
inferior?This is one kink in his logic. But there is another. Consider, if men have to be
socialized to fight and have to be inculcated with the culture of war, as the book
avers—"It is to prepare men for sacrifice, as well as reward them for the risks they
have taken that much of the culture of war was first invented and has continued to
develop across the ages’’ (p. 407)—then maleness per se must not be much of a driver,
and certainly not as strong a driver as is the all-too-human desire to live.
Ironically, it may be less Van Creveld’s take on ‘‘sex and war’’ than his conception
of culture that bollixes him up, preventing him from being able to close his own
nature-drives-nurture, nurture-builds-on-nature argument. ‘‘Culture’’ in his book
refers to what is cultivated (art, literature, film, etc.), what is enculturated (e.g., prac-
tices), what is inculcated (emotions), what people make with their hands (e.g., weap-
ons), and what they think in their heads—and it changes. Even in the snippets of
military history he relates, Van Creveld catalogs changes in uniforms, weaponry,
forms of commemoration, and so on. In doing so he reveals that styles of warfare
(to include styles of thinking about war) shift even if, in his view, the substance of war
does not. Without necessarily meaning to, Van Creveld thus points to a potentially
profound paradox. On one hand, there are certain constants required to succeed in war
(any war), such as force. Yet style—and ensuring people remain attracted to war—is
also crucial. The implication? Getting the style ‘‘right’’ really can matter, which begs
at least two questions: What exactly composes, or should compose, a culture of war in
the twenty-first century? And, more specifically, what should constitute our culture of
war, assuming we do not want others to dictate the terms of either war—or culture—to
us? These may not be the questions Van Creveld wants us to ask, but suggesting a dou-
ble helix effect involving style and substance (or form and function) makes The Cul-
ture of War a quintessential Van Creveld book—provocative, even as it provokes. In
turn, that should make it an ideal work to teach. Less ideal is if readers accept Van
Creveld’s history as definitive, which it is not. In this regard, Sex and War is even
more troubling since it offers even more pages of footnotes and will thus seem author-
itative to many. Unfortunately, its sourcing reflects a different kind of substance-as-
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style problem and is one that (alas) plagues more than just the study of war these days.
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In January of 1973, 591 American prisoners of war held by North Vietnam were
returned to American soil as part of Operation Homecoming. Unfortunately, approx-
imately 100 Americans expected to return at Operation Homecoming did not. Some of
these men were known to have been taken captive. Others were known only to have
survived their incidents while still others were thought to be still alive. Although it
was expected that the North Vietnamese would account for these men as either alive
or dead, they did not. As a result, the POW/MIA controversy was born.
In Until the Last Man Comes Home, Michael J. Allen examines the POW/MIA
experience through the comprehensive and exhaustive research of Congressional
records, memoirs, histories, declassified files, and interviews. Allen sorts through the
archives and chronicles the political wrangling and infighting that emerged as a result
of the Vietnam POW and MIA situation. His use of internal documents, especially the
unpublished sources of MIA activist groups, produces an amazing picture of politics
involved in the issue.
Except for one chapter examining the recovery of war dead dating back to the Mex-
ican and Civil Wars, the book devotes its energy to tracing the Vietnam POW/MIA
issue from the early days of Lyndon B. Johnson to the current policies of Barack
Obama. Allen focuses most of his attention on advocacy groups such as the National
League of Families (the creators of the ubiquitous POW flag) and the Victory in Viet-
nam Association (the originators of the POW/MIA bracelets). He offers extensive evi-
dence that POW/MIA activists intentionally and unintentionally manipulated
politicians, society, and international policy in their quest for a full accounting of
America’s warriors.
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